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Abstract 
The paper unfolds the problem of time focusing primarily on the dimension of the 
future, while, in the background of its sui generis questionings, it is based by a 
continuous, and again questioning, dialogue with Aristotle and Martin Heidegger. It is 
the existence of the future which is foremost analyzed, unravelled, dismantled, and 
thought over in the course of this research. First, as Will-Being, then as Hold-Being.1 As 
a being, that is, which – in a particular view of the future – we, humans, Holding on to 
ourselves, will and must Hold always, and which, with time, Holds on to us at the same 
time. Therefore the being of future must be grasped first as a being which … Is Not Yet. 
Consequently the following meditations ask and think over the question: what kind of 
existence is this Not-Yet-Being after all? And then: what is the actual, living, richly 
meaningful ontological, existential, and historical horizon of this question? It is here 
that the problem of human history, human death, and human freedom unfolds from, with 
a view to the horizon of its possible meanings and outlined possibilities of meanings. 
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* 
 
 The issue of the future has probably interested people ever since the very 
beginning. Man as man can probably be unimaginable without this concern.  
                                                 
1
 Lesz-lét: lesz = future tense of “to be”; Fog-lét: the word “fog” = a particle used for forming the 
future tense of verbs, and the verb meaning “hold”, and “lét” = being. In analyzing the nature 
being of the future, the author actually investigates that intriguing possibility of the Hungarian 
language, worthy of philosophical examination, which otherwise would seem a “mere” phonetic 
or semantic “homonymy”. Similarly to Hegel’s treatment of the word Aufhebung (to sublate), 
very important to him at that time, in his Science of Logic. There he writes: “'To sublate' has a 
twofold meaning in the language… But it is certainly remarkable to find that a language has 
come to use one and the same word for two … meanings. It is a delight to speculative thought to 
find in the language words which have in themselves a speculative meaning; the German 
language has a number of such.” See, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Science of Logic, 
Copyright © 2001 Blackmask Online, http://www.blackmask.com. Letöltve: 
http://www.hegel.net/en/pdf/Hegel-Scilogic.pdf (Downloaded June 4, 2010.) (Author’s and 
translator’s note.)  
 Naturally, future has always presented and still presents a concern for the man 
primarily in order to predict or guess what it will bring about and what will happen “in 
it”. Or rather, what will become – “in it”, again – of all the things that he has planned 
and achieved.   
 All these things must have been so important for us humans since ancient times 
that we have always turned to fortune tellers, prophecies, magic, dreams, wisdom… and 
of course undertook the pains of sciences and pseudo-sciences in order to answer them. 
 Richard Rorty might perhaps be right in saying that thinkers only began to more 
seriously deal with the problem of the future, and time itself, when they finally gave up 
the hope for the knowledge of eternity.1 The first philosophers allegedly still believed 
that the differences between past and future can be neglected… Therefore it was only 
towards the end of the Middle Ages that philosophers started to lose their interest in 
eternity and paid increasingly more attention to the problem of time.2  
 Historically speaking, this standpoint is of course much debatable;3 at any rate, 
it should be radically revised… Nevertheless, it is probably true that the issue of the 
future began to gain special emphasis only towards the end of the 18th century,4 which 
was enforced, with the problematization of historicity and research, towards the mid- 
and late 19th century, reaching its highest in the 20th. To such an extent that by the end of 
the last century a new scholarly discipline, futurology or the study of the future, started 
to gain ground, dealing with the research of the future.  
 What is more, at that time more and more voices started discussing the “future’s 
shock”.5 Future had become a “shock” by that time because it could no longer be a 
shelter. And also because we can no longer have any present shelters – prepared, let’s 
say, from the past, from tradition – against it. So – as they experienced – the future 
always arrives… too early these days. Therefore there can be no orientation whatsoever 
within it, nor with the help of it.6 On the contrary, it keeps disturbing and upsetting the 
allegedly “more secure” orientation with the compass of the algorithms of familiarities 
or novelty productions.  
 Regardless of all this, future still remains one dimension or “ecstasy” of time, 
which cannot be discussed outside, or beyond, the discussion of time.  
 
                                                 
1
 See, Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Future In: Rorty and Pragmatism: The Philosopher 
Responds to His Critics, ed. Herman J. Saatkamp, (Nashville (Tennessee): Vanderbilt University 
Press, 1995), 197–205. 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 As already mentioned, people were probably concerned with their future ever since the 
beginnings of their history, otherwise they would not have venerated the institutions of wizards, 
shamans, fortune-tellers, oracles – commonly termed Mysteries. Implicitly, the case is similar for 
sages, thinkers, philosophers as well. Without such a concern they could not have undertaken the 
task of perfecting themselves and humans in general, by making them partake in truth, kindness, 
and beauty. Or, for that matter, neither that of amending the laws and the community order, for 
example by outlining the possibilities of an “ideal”, or at least empirically more operational state 
or constitution. As undertaken by, say, a Solon, a Plato, or an Aristotle… 
4
 Let us think of Kant, for instance, the philosophically most radical analyzer of the problem of 
time after Aristotle and Augustine, but already by referring his metaphysical designs directly to 
“all future metaphysics”.  
5
 Alvin Toffler published a highly successful and influential book with this title in 1970.  
6
 See Alvin Toffler, Future Shock (Random Hause, New York, 1970). 
The future and its coming1 
 The first and foremost thing that one says about the future is that it will come. 
Directly or indirectly, in most languages people perceive the future primarily with 
reference to “coming”. Therefore the future is always rendered – more or less outlined in 
a horizon-like manner – as something that “will arrive”, and then it will (then) be. That 
is, future is what will come into being! 
 However, what only “will be” – naturally – is not yet, or does not exist yet. The 
future is thus something which is not yet, but it will come, and in coming, it will be. 
Future is therefore a mysterious thing… and in all certainty it is primarily this “will be” 
that is the most mysterious about it! Since, as we have seen, the “will be” means 
precisely something or sends us to something which isn’t there yet or there isn’t yet… 
But which nevertheless… will be, will come into being… then.  
 How can one grasp then even the mere question of such a “mysterious” non-
being? 
 Well, probably by addressing our first question not to the issue of the “Will be”, 
but much rather by asking what is this “Yet”ς Or even by asking how can we understand 
the “isn’t there”, which – existentially, thus still as a “will be” – is connected to 
something which is exactly: the future? Because it is evident from the beginning – and 
especially problematic, too – that here, as it emerges and outlines in this approach, in the 
“isn’t there yet” of the “will be”, the “yet” actually pertains to the “present” (to the 
“present time”, the “presentness of the time”, and to none other…). Nonetheless, in a 
very special manner. That is, exactly by opening it – i.e., the present – to that what will 
(then) be. So “that” what will be, is-not-yet on the one hand, but the “yet” in it will be in 
fact in such a way that, in coming, it will (then) come. Once it will come, that certain 
“that” or “this” will (then) (still) become (the) “present”.  
 However, on the other hand, that what “will be”, always comes in such a way 
that the time passes (“meanwhile”). That what “will be” in one of its decisive relations 
does not in fact – only! – “come”, but the passing also passes towards itself (as if 
spreading-reaching-approaching it).  
 Now: the future is precisely the direction in which time – from the past to the 
present and with the present itself – passes forward, or rather, passes on. The future as 
the (mere) passing-on of time can be called – with not quite appropriate words – 
“physical future”.2 From this point of view the following – coming – spring also 
“comes” like this, since – now! – time passes towards it.  
 So the future here is rather a sui generis, “mere” or sketchy direction of time, 
indifferent to events, devoid of content, and quite ambiguously doubtful or questionable. 
Aristotle himself thought that our statements about definite events happening tomorrow 
                                                 
1
 The word for “future” in Hungarian (“jövő”) is the present participle form of the verb “to come” 
(“jönni”). And not only in Hungarian, but also the German Zukunft is derived from zukommen, 
and in Romanian too “viitorul vine”…  
2
 Not appropriate, because for physics it is exactly the “passing” of time which makes it most 
problematic. In one of his letters written to a friend, Einstein states that past, present, and future 
are merely illusions, although persistent and obstinate illusions. Therefore in a strict sense no 
physical concept corresponds to the passage of time. From the point of view of physics the 
passing of time can only be an inaccurate concept or idea of everyday life. In physics – that is: in 
“reality” – time does not pass, it simply is. As something “identical” with what clocks measure… 
See Paul Davies, “That mysterious flow”, Scientific American 287, September 2002. 
or a thousand years from now are problematic especially because, on the one hand, it is 
questionable whether there will or will not be any future events at all, and on the other 
hand, it is again incidental whether definite, specific things or events will or will not 
happen…1 
 So, all these having been said: the future is – at least, at the moment – that what 
comes, on the one hand, and also that towards which time passes, on the other. 
Consequently in this light and moment the “will be” is exactly that what is constituted in 
the undecided and essentially undecidable and indefinable “encounter” of the coming 
and the passage towards (as not-yet-is). Then! 
 This is in fact precisely what we always mean by saying: Then! Therefore we 
must also ask what this “Then” is, or what does it meanς 
 Well, this Then means nothing else – at least apparently – than that permanent 
and future then when something – that is, something remaining indeterminate – Will be 
in a time coming and passing towards it. In Aristotelian terms, the Then, actually and 
specifically, is the primary horizon of the ousia (that is, the primary essential 
horizon) of a future indeterminate then-ness.2 Such a horizon though which, as we have 
seen, stands in the more comprehensive horizon of “Yet”, but at the same time it also 
forms another horizon-like (further) opening which opens (still further) up for the Yet a 
specific space seeing towards the future in its coming and passing towards.  
 This peculiar space and horizon is essentially “negative”. Or, more precisely: it 
is outlined and articulated by negativity. Since what will (Then) be is meanwhile still: is-
not-yet. Or rather: it is not exactly as Yet.  
 Of course, the Yet primarily and outstandingly denotes and names that what 
goes on and, as such, always, “already”: is. In other words, the Yet is exactly the actual 
content of an ongoing persistence, which clasps that which is inherently persistent. The 
dictionary defines Yet as something which “remains further for a while in a state 
preceding that of the present, and continues the action begun in the past also in the 
present and perhaps in the future…”.3 
 The horizon of the Yet is therefore quite wide and comprehensive… We have 
seen that it opens up “from the inside” to that what – albeit specifically – is-not-(yet)! 
However, it was also about this that we said: as Will-be, this is exactly the future. As 
what Will-be is exactly not-Yet, and it is not exactly as Yet… But we have also 
proposed that the Yet – as an ongoing persistence – also pertains to the present. It is by 
this pertinence that it holds further on to that what persists. It is the Yet again which 
                                                 
1
 See Aristotle, On Interpretation, transl. E. M. Edghill, Section I, Part. 9 
http://classics.mit.edu//Aristotle/interpretation.html, downloaded on  Febr. 27, 2010. 
2
 For a background of all Aristotelian references and interpretations see the subchapter entitled 
Poté és khrónos: ismét  Arisztotelésznél (Pote (ποτέ) and Chronos (χȡόνοȢ): again at Aristotle) in 
my volume Halandóan lakozik szabadságában az ember... (Mortally dwells the man in his 
freedom...), (Bratislava (Pozsony): Kalligram, 2007), 205–241. Furthermore, see: Aristote: 
Physique, texte établi et traduit par Henri Carteron, (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1990), I.–II. 
[French-Ancient Greek bilingual edition], and Aristote, [Cathégorie], texte établi et traduit par 
Richard Bodéüs, (Paris: Société d’Édition Les Belles Lettres, 2001) [French-Ancient Greek 
bilingual edition]. 
3
 A magyar nyelv értelmező szótára (Interpretive Dictionary of the Hungarian Language), ed. by 
the Institute for Linguistics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 
1959–1962). 
opens up – in time and with time – the present to that what is-not. As an is-not-yet. So 
the horizon and force field of the Yet extends from the Is – the Is-Yet – and penetrates 
as far as the Is-not – the Is-not-Yet. 
 This is only possible of course if, above all this, the Yet somehow “connects” 
with the Already. This also reveals that the Yet permanently “touches”, “clasps” or runs 
across “all” the dimensions or ecstasies of time. Because – connecting with the Already 
– the Yet holds, from the past and through the present, in the horizon of an undecided, 
yet “complete” openness – that is, an openness extending to the is-not – that what: 
holds.1 
 Or else there could be no kind of connection or linkage between “Is” and “Is 
not”, to be or not to be. The “Not to be”, non-being, or the Nothing cannot be “logically” 
deduced, nor understood from “to be”, from being. And this also stands for the opposite.  
 So, the Yet pertains to the fine structure of being and the constancy and 
persistence connected to it, and it does so in the very specific way that it also articulately 
opens, projects, mediates and “structures” it, from the Not-Yet to the explicit No, to the 
future possibilities of Non-being, of perishing, of the Nothing. That what “Is Yet”, 
always exists in such a way that it has no possible future lasting as Will-be as Yet…, 
and thus also in a way that in the future its future Will be exactly such, that it is possible 
that it Will-not-be at all. That is, it is possible that its lasting – Then – will not even 
last… 
 So the Yet pertains indeed to the fine structure of lasting, but in a way that it 
articulates its foresight, its fore-reaching to the future. As opposed to the Already, which 
sends primarily to the past, to Had-Been-ness.2 The Yet-To-be, the Yet-To-last etc. 
grasp (also) in fact that what there is in the present, or rather that what is present as 
present… But only in the understanding in which its being lies at the same time – and 
especially – in the exposedness of the is-not-yet, the Not-Yet-Being of the future, of the 
Will-be-ness! 
 Really, the “is-not” means exactly: not to exist, to lack existence. That what “is-
not”, lacks exactly its existence, or it is exactly existence that it is deprived of. And what 
will-be, it must be stressed, lacks existence in quite a peculiar way: exactly as a Yet. It is 
not yet, (but) it will be. Because, on the one hand, it comes. And, on the other hand, time 
passes towards it.  
 
* 
 
 Now, it may also emerge that the Will-be is not necessarily a mere or an 
essentially empty undecidedness, forerunning to “emptiness”. On the contrary – and in 
advance – the Will-be also contains “certainty” in a certain sense. Naturally: as a 
possibility.  
 For example, my own death from the very moment of my birth, or rather by my 
birth, “falls into” my own future; while in a certain – and only seemingly superficial – 
                                                 
1
 On the concept of Already and its roles and ontological characteristics in constituting the Had-
Been-ness and the Past, see my study entitled “Had-Been-ness and Past”, Philobiblon – Bulletin 
of the Lucian Blaga Central University Library, IV–VII(1999–2002): 312–360. 
2
 See my study entitled “Múlt és VOLTság” (Past and Had-Been-ness) in the volume: István 
Király V., Filozófia és Itt-Lét (Philosophy and Dasein), (Cluj-Napoca (Kolozsvár): Erdélyi 
Híradó, 1999), 79–126; and also Király V., “Had-Been-ness and Past”.  
sense my life is nothing else than the passage of its time towards my death. But the case 
with the next spring or the next day is somewhat similar. They are also in a way part of 
the future ever since long ago, and in a quite certain way. Therefore they will also come 
in such a way that time actually passes towards them.  
 The question is now how is that possible and what is the significance of the fact 
that the Not-yet – as a peculiar and essential “element” of the Will-be, the existence, or 
at least the ontological structure of the future – opens up to something which in its kind 
is certain, albeit as a possibility? Because, let me repeat, in the course of my life my 
death for me – and for everybody else as well – is on the one hand certain and definite, 
and on the other hand it will always and only be, alive, in the future, in my future. So, 
although in the course of my life my death is-not-yet always as Will-be, it is still not 
possible that it will not be at all or ever… 
 It is apparent however, that we stand here entirely in the horizon of Yet, but in a 
negative direction: Still-not-yet! However, this has also been revealed by a – probably 
mediated – particular contact of the horizon of Yet with the horizon of Will-be. Because 
that what is-not-Yet, but Will definitely Be, and Will Be in a way that it cannot happen 
for it not to be… Well, this necessarily sends to something which is capable of grasping, 
and also more specifically articulating the previously outlined horizon of Yet. Which is, 
at the same time, also connected to the horizons of Will-be, again in a particularly 
articulated way.  
 In order for a better understanding of this, one must also make here a little 
digression. Because the present situation and state of questioning and interpretation 
indirectly also reveals that, for example, the Past – as we have seen it in a previous 
study1 – Was-Is in fact as Not-any-more, the present passes exactly as Already-is in the 
Will-Be-Becoming direction of the future as Is-not-Yet. As Heidegger says: not-any-
more and not-yet. Past and future.  
 Both are of course “negations”, that is, negativity and privation (sterésis, 
privatio), but one constitutes the Past, while the other the Future. Denying in different 
directions or – negatively – contacting the Is as privation, or rather the Dasein present in 
the present as presence. In such a way, that is, that during this while both negativities 
constitute a particular existence. Because: Had-Been-ness constitutes, or better: directly 
means the existence of Not-any-more, while Will-be that of Not-yet. Both are – let me 
repeat again – particular beings constituted exactly by negation or negativity. 
 However, that what is deprived precisely of (its) existence, is called, most 
directly: Nothing.2 But none of the Had-been, the Past, the Will-be, and the Future are 
Nothing, although all are constituted and exist in a particular way somehow exactly in 
the horizon of negation, more precisely the negation of being, the privation of being.  
 Better said, they both stand in some kind of horizon of nothingness. Since, I 
repeat: that what Had-been – but which is by no means Past in an actual sense3 – is 
exactly in such a way that it is not precisely as Any-more. Because that what Had-been 
                                                 
1
 See István Király V., Had-Been-ness and Past.  
2
 For details on the Nothing see my study Elzártság, elfedettség és elrejtettség Heideggernél 
(Closedness, Coveredness, and Concealedness at Heidegger) in the volume Határ – Hallgatás – 
Titok (Limit – Silence – Secret), (Cluj-Napoca (Kolozsvár): Korunk Baráti Társaság, 1996), and 
also my study Múlt és VOLTság. 
3
 Ibid. 
means exactly that it is Not-Any-more. Just as the Future also is in a way that it Is-not 
Yet.  
 The Had-Been-ness will only turn into an actual Past if we make it past, that is, 
if we make-pass that what Had-Been. But this way the Never also takes part in the 
constitution of the Past. Because the Past partly also means that what Had-Been, Will 
Never Be (ever) Again. And that is exactly how the Past can be authentically and really 
repeated. And what lasts, is not (yet) Past, but it passes… The lasting or keeping of this, 
or its turning into Had-Been-ness and actual Past Will (Then) pertain to the Future (Yet).  
 In its primary, yet essential outlining, then, something like the future is 
ontologically constituted by the yet almost completely unknown, but gradually already 
approached Will-be. The Will-be is of course not merely “the future tense” of the 
“grammatical” conjugation of the infinitive to be in various languages, but we have 
already seen that the Will-be must be collectively constituted by things like the (Is-not-
)Yet and the similarly wonderful and almost unknown Then.  
 Now – turning back and taking a step forward – one may also say that the Will-
be – and by this to a certain extent the Future itself as well – actually and directly means 
nothing else than a Not-Yet-Being standing in the horizon of Then. Since the horizon of 
the Future understood in the sense of ‘that what is-not-yet’ or ‘that what does-not-yet-
exist’ embraces or opens up to something that ‘Will possibly Not-Be’. It is partly this 
that the Aristotelian example of tomorrow’s sea battle illustrates… But we have also 
seen that the Future taken in the sense of ‘that what does-not-yet-exist’ equally opens up 
to something that Will exactly and definitely Be.  
 However, this is only possible if the horizons and force-fields of the Yet and of 
‘that-what-will-be’ actually meet and collide in the horizon and force-field of the Then, 
mediated and associated by it! The Then does not merely and simply say that – taken in 
general or as usual – Not-yet or It-is-not-yet, but It-will-be. Therefore it demands and 
deserves indeed a more fundamental explanation.  
 We have seen that the Any-more – actually – sends to the ‘before’ and thus to 
the past, and the Yet also sends to the ‘thereafter’ and thus to the future. The Then, of 
course, always sends to the ‘thereafter’ and thus further and deeper into the Future. 
Because that what exists as a Then, is evidently ‘that-what-will-be’. But that what Will-
be like this – as a Then – is not merely the coming any longer, or it is not only outlined 
in an – albeit positioned, yet – indefinite event or encounter by the forward-passage of 
time, but it is more specific and articulated. Now what is exactly this Then and what 
does it say? 
 Well, the Then – according to the dictionaries as well – is in fact an adverb 
referring and sending to the future. It is one of the specific differences and particular, 
explicitly philosophical possibilities of the Hungarian language that it expresses such a 
sending to the Future by a separate, straight and telling word (‘Majd’). Since, what in 
Hungarian is called ‘Majd’, in most European languages is only expressed by 
circumscribing its typical cases. The German, English, French, or e.g. Romanian 
languages contain no separate words of such straightness. Therefore the Hungarian 
‘Majd’ conceals philosophical possibilities which could even be called outstanding.  
 And it “conceals” because the Then is primarily used to reveal the latent future 
reference of present-tense verbs.1 Further on, the Then is also used for enforcing the 
future references, the future relations of those said. The Then in fact always refers to and 
utters a time which follows the present. Often with an objecting, denying affective 
charge.2 
 By revealing the latent future references of present (tense) verbs, the Then 
creates and keeps a future relationship with the present, or rather with that what actually 
lasts “in it”, and is not just finished. This can only happen of course if in the present the 
Then comes into future-related contact with the present, or actually with the Yet. In such 
a way that – as a liminal and articulated mediator – it grasps and mediates the force-lines 
of the Yet swinging in the direction of the ‘that-what-will-be’, but quite undefined in 
themselves. And by this, or rather together with these, the Then outlines and constitutes 
the ‘that-what-will-be’ as well.  
 This way the Future can indeed be meaningfully called that what Is-not-yet (but) 
Will Then Be. In other words: it is revealed that the ‘that-what-will-be’ – which is 
evidently related to that what is the existence of the Future... – is in fact the being of the 
holding of the Yet and its necessary openness and opening to the non-being, constituted 
in the force-fields articulated and explicitly grasped by means of the Then.  
 Consequently the ‘that-what-will-be’ no longer simply and barely means that 
‘it-is-not-yet’, but by the Then this Non-being in the Yet becomes in fact a highly 
articulated “positiveness”. 
 Now, during this while an unavoidable connection is formed with the non-being, 
or the negation of being – that is, actually with the Nothing – the definition of which 
needs further attention.  
 However, as we have said earlier with a more general validity, that what is not 
exactly as a Yet, it is still primarily a Will-Be – or more precisely it is outlined exactly 
as a ‘that what will be’. And surely, we have said it in all rightness. Of course, it must 
also be said that it is: the Future. So, that what comes – at least on the one hand. On the 
other hand however, it comes in such a way that the time passes towards it. In other 
words: by its own passage, time does not pass in such a way that it constantly passes 
towards (its own) future, and thus it reaches or fetches it. This is what Heidegger states 
when saying that the time (itself) is not temporal.3 Because otherwise time would lose or 
cancel itself, or eat itself up.  
 However, the statement that time is not temporal does not mean that it is 
atemporal, it is outside time, or that it is timeless or eternal. The statement that time is 
not temporal means that its meaning – or rather the horizon of its meaning-constitution 
and its “runway” – is beyond time “itself”.  
                                                 
1
 See: A magyar nyelv történeti-etimológiai szótára (Dictionary of historical etymology of the 
Hungarian language), ed. by Loránd Benkő, (Budapest: Akadémiai, 1967), and A magyar nyelv 
értelmező szótára (Explanatory dictionary of the Hungarian language), ed. by the Institute of 
Linguistics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (Budapest: Akadémiai, 1959–1962).  
2
 Ibid.  
3
 See, Martin Heidegger, “Zeit und Sein”, in Zur Sache des Denkens (Tübingen: Max Niemayer 
Verlag, 1969), 1–26. 
 Time and the meaning of time exists in a way that time can never reach “to”  
this meaning “by itself” – by simply passing or extending – as if “fulfilling” it!1 The 
actual and at the same time mostly hidden meaning or horizon of meaning of time is 
exactly the When! 
 A dialogue with Aristotle also reveals that in its original and primary essence 
(the question of) the poté, the When is by far not the direct, precise definition of a 
moment or a period of time, but it is in fact “only” a category. That is: a (basic) 
question or a basis for questioning.2 And only thus and only to this extent is “time” in 
fact a category. Therefore it is only and exclusively the question and the interrogation of 
When? in which the Yet, the Any More, the Any Time, the now/then, the before, the 
after, etc. may have a meaning. And the ‘Majd’ too, of course, as also any kind of “verb 
conjugation” and “verb tense” as well.  
 What is more, the Not Any Time – that is, the Never and Not Ever – and the No 
When?, that is, the possible When-lessness can only have a meaning, a horizon of 
meaning in and with the categorial question of the When?. Because we humans can only 
“understand” and “interpret” this – partly very questionable, and partly very certain – 
When-lessness if we start out from the When?.  
 The Future will then be only and exclusively because, coming as ‘that what is 
not yet’, it is fixed as a Non-being, a ‘that what is not’, exactly as a Then, in the horizon 
of meaning articulated by the Yet of the question When?, connected to the essence or 
passage of the new dimension of the being of time. Or more precisely: it is thus and by 
this that it opens up in a particularly outlined and fixed way in the “indefinableness” and 
openness of Not-yet-being.  
 So to whatever extent may the Future (also) pertain to the realm of possibilities, 
that is by far not the edgeless, inarticulate, and the least formal-indifferent “territory” of 
possibilities, or more precisely eventualities. But – so we see it! – it is something that 
always pertains and belongs to us.  
 Essentially – just like the Any-More, the Yet, or the ‘that what will be’ – the 
Then is also a (further) questioning attachment of the (basic) question of When?.3 For 
it is clear that we are speaking explicitly about meaning – or rather horizon of meaning 
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– in this case as well. Because other things are also attached to the ‘that what will be’, 
such as the ‘almost’-like ‘did not happen’-being, skimming the edge of existence, or that 
what Will-not-be/Should-not-be/Did-not-happen Then because of the cautiousness of a 
warning. (Don’t!... this or that Then…) 
 It is certainly this fundamental and specifically ontological (linguistic-
ontological) contemplation of the Yet, the Then, and through these of the ‘that what will 
be’ which sets forth and exhibits the “holding” [fogás – see Note 1.] used in Hungarian 
in forming the future tense of verbs. This “holding” equally situates itself primarily into 
the horizon of Then on the one hand, and that of Yet on the other, but by these thirdly 
naturally also into the ‘that what will be’, the ‘not-yet-being’ too.  
 However, surely only and exclusively by the primary, categorial When?, or 
actually starting out of, and being in a constant organic relationship with that. And what 
is more, in such a way that this “holding” already displays the questioner of the When?, 
and the particular, ontological-existential, therefore meaning-centred, self-pertinence of 
the question and its questioning!1  
 It is worth giving a deeper thought, as it forms an authentic philosophical 
possibility, that the Hungarian language expresses the future tense by the verbal 
auxiliary derived from the verb “to hold”, inherited since ancient times. This structure is 
equally used for an emphatic future tense, for a future probability, and also for an 
imperative or a warning with future reference. It does also not seem accidental that this 
language uses the same word – ‘fog’ – to express that bony part of the body, situated in 
the mouth, which humans (and animals) use for holding, chewing and biting (i.e., a 
tooth).2  
 Firstly and most importantly, the term ‘fog’ [hold] is not some kind of technical-
terminological noun, but precisely a verb. Moreover, it is a kind of verb the meaning of 
which is somehow connected primarily to possession. Even in the epistemological 
connections of the word ‘fogalom’ [notion]. Since this – and, what’s more! primarily 
this – also “holds” something, or something “is held” by it! 
 That is, the Hungarian ‘fogni’ [to hold] is exactly related to that what the Greek 
ousia names and expresses in its primary and pre-terminological sense – although 
constantly maintaining its authenticity and being put to good use in terminology as 
well.3 Because the ousia also sends to property, possession, taking possession, tenure, 
and especially to the grasping – recte: the holding! – of its essence as it is revealed in 
this horizon. 
 Asking and revealing that what is essential, or that what is the essence itself, the 
Greek ousia also sends and – with a categorial universality – also constrains us 
questionably and questioningly to take possession of it, and examine what it essentially 
is… And to also examine of course how it can be grasped and taken into possession. At 
least as a possession of cognition. That is: how can it be taken into a notion [fogalom], 
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the holding of a notion [fogalom fogásába], into holdingness [fogottságba], into 
possession or property. 
 It is probably also not accidental that we all “hold” or try to “hold” – explicitly 
in Hungarian, implicitly in other languages – the time, especially with regard to future, 
trying to present it in holding and in its being held. Because time itself is essentially 
connected to something which “holds on” to us, or directly keeps us “held”. And this 
will always and necessarily, exclusively and again essentially be and happen and be 
fulfilled Then, in the future, as a ‘that what will be’, as a ‘to be coming’.  
 The name of this necessary and always primarily future-oriented factuality is 
nothing else than: death, my death, our death. This, let me repeat, for us live beings – 
for only the living humans are those who create and use notions, act, examine, hope, 
make plans, and remember, judge, think, or even… die – lies always in the (certain) 
future of our lives, or what’s more, it is the future of our lives. Meaning also the process 
of (our) dying, that is, its (still) living, but particular life experience as well.  
 So on account of death the Future actually “holds on” to everything that holds 
in life, and thus it “makes” indeed essential and factual with regard to its own particular 
essence that what holds and lasts in it – or in “everything”, for that matter… And which 
is thus: constant. 
 This is why only that can count as essential what is “constant” and lasting. So 
constancy can only be understood through time, and “within” it, only through Future, 
and not by mere measurement and the stubbornness of the results of this measurement.  
 Therefore we must ask now the following question as well: does the category of 
When? as a question not “come” or originate directly and actually from the Futureς Or, 
by this, is it not so that every single question sets out towards the future? 
 For, is it not exactly the nature of questionableness and question itself, the 
existential-ontological structure and meaning of questioning to mobilize (of course in 
definite ways and always towards definite directions)? And is it also not the central 
“element” of a question itself what epistemologists precisely call a “desideratum”ς1 And 
is it not exactly the future that the “desire”, the “requirement”, the “desideratum”, and 
the state of questioning mobilization created, displayed, expressed, and represented by it 
is projected upon in a defined – that is, questioningly designed – way? And is it not 
exactly the meaning of “asking questions” to open up, outline, and thus primarily grasp 
– hold – that what we are “just” searching to knowς2 We search for it in order to hold or 
possess its “essence” as knowledge (as a notion). Ousia! 
 However, when something is opened up and grasped in a questionable and 
questioning way, then the questioner itself too, directly and factually, is existentially 
mobilized, outlined, drawn into, and validated, explicitly and in an articulate way, in the 
initiating, sweeping search of questioning, with regard to, or as a projection into, the 
Future. 
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 So then, the ‘fog’, by which the Hungarian language renders and expresses the 
future, as it is not some kind of mere notional noun, but a verb, expresses the categorial 
questioning force of the ousia in a direct, unmediated way. Including also the mobility 
and tensions of its questioning force fields, especially in the force and – evidently – 
force necessity of the ‘fog’, the ‘fogás’ (holding)! And its reflexivity too, of course. 
Because that what we hold or keep held, reflexively holds us and keeps us held. For only 
thus is it the essence and it is essential and only thus do we belong to ourselves with it, 
and to it as ourselves.  
 So: as a projection into the future, every questioning is actually and originally a 
holding, and therefore everything which is connected to the future – Fog-lét (Hold-
being) – is essentially questionable, or it is connected to the categorial, essential and 
universal fundamental issue of questionableness! Consequently: “to questioningly 
dwell” means directly to be in a way that is “meanwhile” intentionally open to the 
holding of that what itself holds as essential… and the advent of which therefore always 
exists in the Hold-being, that is, in the “that what will be”, or the Then of the Not-yet-
being. 
 So this also revealed that the being of the Future is not merely the “that what 
will be”, but – at the same time, yet also beyond it and much rather – the Hold-Being. 
Which is of course always a “Will Then Be”, because it Isn’t there Yet and There isn’t 
Yet. The Hold-Being therefore does not only mean that what will be and as such, will 
hold us… but also that what we also have to hold and keep is held openly so that we 
should not “simply” be, but be ourselves. This in fact, therefore, means to dwell 
questioningly, that is, openly and freely, in a truly mortal-holding and held way.  
 The essential acceptance of this also essential point, and the actual acquirement 
– holding and possession – of this acceptance, for the time being, pertains to the Future 
as Yet. As a question to be asked and to be held, by which we humans may possibly 
understand why we continuously or sooner or later always ask questions about 
everything. 
 For, as an ultimate horizon: we have still not found out where in fact this When? 
comes from and originates. Or for that matter where its connected “holding” comes from 
and originates.  
 Nonetheless, it can probably be acknowledged more organically and articulately 
that all this primarily comes and originates from death itself! Human death, death and 
the future, human death and freedom, death and questioning… not only do they not 
“exclude” each other, but one presupposes the other, and they always articulate, mean, 
or call each other. So, if we ask with a Heideggerian turn “Why is whyς”, then we may 
answer with all certainty: because we will die! 
 But, naturally, not only the “Whyς”, but every single question and their all-time 
questioning – questioning itself, that is – exists for this [ez-ért]! For this is where every 
reality, reason [ért-elem], understanding [ért-és], and also touching [érint-és] comes 
and originates from, as well as everything that can drive away all the mere 
contingencies. The Why?, just like the Why is why? is just its carrying in circles. 
Carrying in circles (peri-odos), which, as such, is interval-like, and therefore: 
calculating.  
 It is calculating by touching. Its touching is nothing else than an occasion for an 
event just sounding, fixed and opening in the language. Of course, an occasion taken in 
the sense of reality. That is, the event of the “Whyς” and – primarily – the “Whenς” also 
exists for it. Since it is for this end [ez-ért], as it originates from the same place. And of 
course it also keeps towards this place, towards here. So this is its reason [ért-elme] as 
well.  
 And now we can also see more directly, that the existential-ontological fine 
structure of this openness is exactly the questioning, and primarily the basic question, 
the categorial-questioning force of When? 
 Every element or type of relation to the future revealed, for example, by 
Heidegger – escaping the future (escaping death), the waiting, the self-anticipation, the 
running forth, the planning, the hope, the prediction etc. necessarily have the structure of 
a When? taken in a basic – even originally categorial – sense! Therefore the digression, 
the waiting, as well as one’s self-anticipation or running forth towards the possibility are 
all conditioned and outlined by the certain possibility of the impossibility of existence 
(that is: death) and its revelation.1 This is what the event of language – with the 
auxiliary-outlining references of the future-forming ‘fog’, ‘fogni’ [to hold] – calls Hold-
Being.  
 This happens similarly to the relations with the past or with the present, in a 
different reference of course. For the relating itself, or the reference itself as something 
present, like a mode of being, or the explicitly thematizing relation to death is 
essentially questionable, questioning, and question-inducing in its openness! That is, it 
has from the very beginning the ontological-existential structure of the question and of 
questioning. The (other) name of which is: freedom.  
 Self-anticipation is also included into this. Because that is exactly the meaning 
of “asking questions”! To project and anticipate oneself in a definite – further and 
further opening! – way, to definite (lacking) directions! That is: to be projected into the 
future, to open up, and be opened to the future.  
 The co-original and congenial articulation of death, the future, questioning, and 
freedom has two, different, yet interconnected names. One is the “am”, the sum, the 
other is history. For I am so that I exist together and meet – in a questionableness 
referring to meanings – “everything” in a mortal and therefore questionable way in the 
dangerous and holding-constraining freedom of the openings and openness of 
questioning, always in the primordiality of my mortality with regard to (the future of) 
the Not-Yet-Being – that is, being held (fogva) in the sense discussed above. Together 
with all the “other” mortals of all times and – in a different perspective – with all the 
“other” beings.  
 And what else is history than the mortals’ actual, holding and questioning, free, 
questioningly and dangerously inter-held, life-creating, self- and life-destructing being-
together with the beings in and with being? So this is in fact what we mortals call the 
times of history, or historical time.  
 
* 
 
  Although it might be true that no concept of time expressed and outlined 
exclusively under the parameters of natural history – and even less natural science – can 
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possibly reach the essence of time, one must still ask the question whether there are 
indeed “so many kinds” of time. Or, whether the relation and connection of the different 
“types of time” is indeed mere derivation. If this was really the case, then what is this 
derivation based on, and how is it possible at all?  
 No matter how true it might be that man – the Dasein, the being-here – truly is a 
world- and life-founding and creating being, it is just as true that man uses this quality as 
a factor of “nature”, or more precisely, physis.1 Not in the sense that he were composed 
of natural (say, biological, etc.) and “non-natural” (say, spiritual, intellectual, or social) 
“pieces”; much rather, I have in mind a real characteristic of being, namely a partaking 
in existence as a new dimension of being, calling to life and thus pertaining and aiming 
to it as being held and free.2   
 In the course of his coming into being, the man as an earthly being also partakes 
in the partly cosmic, partly planetary experience of the “primordial” context which at 
least all other earthly “organisms” felt and endured “at all times” and in which they had 
also partaken.3 This of course has its own “biological”, “physiological”, “neurological”, 
and even genetic consequences, which would not only be hard, but also irresponsible to 
deny.4  
 The cognitive, cellular, and molecular neurological researches on time-sense 
and time-consciousness yield more and more interesting results. These results 
demonstrate that we have no purely “biological” or purely “intellectual” processes 
connected to time, but the “simple” sensing of time and the temporality of our biological 
nature, meaning also our “biological clock”, etc., are equally connected to the highest 
functions of the brain and of consciousness, and the most important life functions. And 
this is also valid for cosmic and planetary, but also psychological,5 ecological, or social 
aspects.  
 All these relate thus to the mobility of human life, which lives and may only 
live, on the one hand, in its being counted – according to the previous and the next – by 
the other movements. And which, on the other hand, does not only count “cognitively” 
or “consciously” with its own being or life, but it counts and enumerates, by the 
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previous and the next, the growing proportion of existence of the beings moving or 
staying still in its world, with regard to their existence…1  
 All these are completed by the revolution going on nowadays in physics – for 
instance, by the work of Stephen W. Hawking. It seems increasingly more unavoidable 
to acknowledge and theoretically accept that physics and natural sciences in general 
cannot disregard that in their researches they “deal with” a universe in which the human 
being was born! Hawking himself calls this the “anthropic principle” and attributes to it 
a direct – physical – theory-constituting function.  
 Accordingly, the only authentic theory or “image” of the universe, even from 
the point of view of the natural science called physics, is that which can reckon with the 
fact that there is at least one intelligent being created in it,2 together with the – not very 
promising – perspectives of this existence. Including also the fact that it is this very 
being which creates and studies the natural science called “physics”! 
 However, this also means that when the man – the Dasein – takes the 
parameters and means of his dealing with time from these “primordial contexts”, he 
does not merely use the handiest temporal issues to make comfortable time-instruments 
for himself… No, by this he grasps something really fundamental from the point of view 
of existence, of his own existence. Namely, something which counts and holds him and 
which he himself holds and must hold in his existence! Something which, therefore, the 
hold-ing – that is, sending to, and deriving from, the future – means, represents and 
validates, made explicit by the meanings of the When?. 
 This of course does not change the fact that the counting activity of the “soul” 
that Aristotle spoke about would not be a counting with time at the same time… And 
thus something radically different than a mere counting by time. On the contrary, it is 
about a radically new dimension of existence and being – new also in a cosmic sense. A 
being and dimension of existence which existentially questions the When? and with 
this, also time. And which thus measures not only the length, but also the weight of life. 
And of course its meaning and significance as well.  
 It does so in such a way that by this it constitutes history, or rather it articulates 
the historical “itself” in a higher and growing, both ontological and existential, 
dimension and synthesis which connects together the individual, society and nature in 
the symbolicity of time. And which – as a so-called “social time institution” – itself also 
becomes the primordial (social-historical) context of human generations and individuals 
continuously coming into existence and “following” each other.3 It is the same thing in 
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fact that Heidegger stresses when he connects time-measuring to counting with time, 
especially with respect to the beings living within the world.1 
 It is true therefore that the Dasein is self-anticipating from the beginning, but it 
is also true that it is such in a “world”, in and perhaps for an existence which is mostly 
non self-anticipating, yet still counting and counted in its parallel movements. So it does 
make a difference what it is that it will Then meet, anticipating, projecting, and 
understanding itself, and When? and How? 
 Surely this is why the Dasein has concerned itself ever since ancient times with 
things such as the knowledge and manipulation of the future or weather forecast. 
Because it is not only the exact time of a hurricane, a tsunami, or some new meteorite 
that is relevant for the Dasein to know, but also the future development and appearance 
of those ontic, ontological, existential – and as such, also historical – processes the 
“knowledge” of which naturally has its organic effects over the present, and also over 
the “judgment”, passage, or authentic repetition of the past as well.2  
 So the man dwells questioningly indeed! Because he dies! That is: he is mortal! 
Or more precisely: because he can become mortal.  
 Turning back thus to the first, initial thoughts of the article: the issue and subject 
of the future has surely interested humans ever since the beginnings. The man as a man 
is probably unthinkable without such an interest. However, the man is only a man and 
only counts as man – even in historiography – when he starts burying his dead peers.  
 By that, therefore, which holds him, interests him: the issue of his death. Death, 
his death, which will come and – especially Then – will hold him! Being held by it, he 
must now – in his life and with his life – hold it somehow as well. 
 The man became man – that is, a calling-to-life and urging existence belonging 
to itself and pertaining to existence – when death, the ultimate incommunicable, 
constrained him – and at the same time opened him up – to the communicative, that is, 
commonly ordered world-like and of course historical necessities of that what leads 
beyond himself and his own existence. 
 So “factually” the man is first born in and with the presence of the Nothing, of 
non-being, called and evoked by the silent, quietly or noisily surrounded muteness of the 
burial, of the dead body. Together with his “consciousness” and other requisites.  
 In fact, once “ready”, the man counts for the man only with the consciousness of 
death.3 Or rather: he counts, can count himself. Of course, the man, historically 
speaking, does not “get” the consciousness of death as some new requisite which 
perfects him or urges to further perfection, as something he had no possession of before; 
but he, so-to-say, ontologically arrives to it. That is, he directly comes to it! Coming to 
it, realizing it…they meet in fact in human death. In such a way that in it the man, as it 
were, comes to himself!  
  Without directly discovering himself, however! So the man, the “mortal” man 
is primarily and necessarily – or rather: seemingly unavoidably – “religious”.4 That is, 
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historically, or as stated by historiography, the man – in the words of Pierre Chaunu – 
became “mortal” and “religious” at the same time.  
 Therefore the question rises at once: what does it mean in fact to “religiously 
become a mortal”ς What else could it possibly mean than somehow becoming mortal 
without-dying? Namely, drawing up death, but as a sort of not-dying.  
 This of course also means to grasp and undertake time – actually and essentially 
– in connection with survival, living-on-beyond, and also connected to the issues of the 
“world”, rather than directly to death and dying. Thus, with regard to man, time 
somehow becomes the history – or rather, myth – of “immortal mortals”.1 So they have 
been burying in fact dead immortals ever since, basically even to these days. For living 
on and resurrection.  
 In spite of this, “factually” it is the burial itself, the presence of the Nothing, the 
non-being evoked and called-for by the silent, quietly or noisily surrounded muteness of 
the dead body that the man is first born from. That is, by his death and the 
“consciousness” of his death, which will come still, and then it will hold him! And 
which – therefore! – has been in his future for a long time, right from the beginning. 
And which is exactly that “something” which originally holds in our existence… and 
which, as such, “gives” weight to our constraints with the past and the present, coming 
from and going towards the future.  
 Therefore the Hold-being is not merely captivity, confinement, imprisonment, 
but exactly that what “measures” everything. Not captivity, therefore, but a being-
captured-ness. Which equally holds together, holds across, holds into, holds around, 
holds out for, and holds… past and present. But which is in the future and always 
“comes” from it.  
 Therefore: not only is death, our death “within” the future, but it is “there” as a 
real and actual constitution which originates, constitutes, articulates, and outlines the 
Hold-being.  
 The Hold-being Holds by death because and by the fact that it Will always Be… 
And it will surely be as something that will be and will happen (then) with us, for us, as 
our own dying. As such, it will surround and define everything “else” which perhaps – 
otherwise – will be… 
 Being held by this, the man must also hold it somehow. Firstly, by counting 
with it. He counts with death, and thus – willingly or unwillingly – counts with time, but 
with the Nothing as well. So he begins to question that what he counts with, and what he 
has to count himself. And that is “the same” in fact than what counts himself as well, 
“beginning” from the end. Something that he has been within for a long time – ever 
since the beginning – that is, since the beginning of the end… 
 This is the actual “determination” of the fact that the issue of the future has 
interested man from the beginnings – that is, it Holds them and sends them on to 
running-forth, to the future, to the Hold-being. The man as man is probably even 
unthinkable without it. Therefore this is the actual beginning, and time may “begin” only 
from here – from the end, from the future.  
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 Consequently, the future did not accidentally get into the “beginning” or 
“middle” of thinking about time just because someone named Martin Heidegger 
considered it interesting for the sake of diversity to think about time itself not in terms of 
the past or the present, but the third, “left-over” element of the future. But exclusively 
because it was acknowledged and undertaken by thinking that the issue of the future – 
just like the problem of time – is actually and precisely the issue of the living man, 
which cannot be thought over without the always certain future death of the living man, 
the living Dasein.  
 The truly undertaken thinking-over of this issue may then reveal also whether or 
not this is exactly where time “originates” from, as well as all kinds of human 
endeavours and concepts connected to it. Including also the counting with time, its 
measuring, and its many kinds of sciences, as well as their particular concepts and 
“theories” connected to various regions of being.  
 It is a great question that, while we keep stressing with ever growing “self-
evidence” that sooner or later any discipline finds itself in the situation that they must 
elaborate their own concept of time, valid and operational for their specific field of 
existence, which other disciplines will only exceptionally be able to apply – well, while 
this happens, is it not exactly the essence – the actual philosophical tasks connected to 
time – that we keep avoiding all the time? 
 So when we most naturally emphasize that the time concept of, say, physics – as 
it happens, nuclear physics – has no “applicability” in the understanding of the particular 
temporality of “subjects” or “phenomena” discussed by the fields of psychology or 
sociology, history or even informatics, do we not disregard the most essential fact that 
all these disciplines – recte: human modes of being – are after all modes of being of 
“one and the same” Dasein? Modes of being which owe their mere existence to the fact 
that they are the modes of being of a being in the existence of which the “stake of the 
game” is this very existence? And that this also means in fact that they are the modes of 
being of a finite being – primarily and ultimately finite as a dying mortal? For the 
existence and being of whom, therefore, time is “valuable” and serious – that is: 
questionable – in all respects! Or, more precisely, time’s explicit and definite, 
existentially, and not merely “epistemologically” articulated questioning, and the actual 
happening of this questioning.  
 This is where the question and questioning of the When? actually and 
essentially originates from! That is, the category of the When?! Just like, in its 
continuation, the question and questioning of What is time?. So this is where every 
questioning of these – originally temporal, that is, historically articulated and conducted, 
in a physical, biological, psychological, sociological, historical, etc. sense – originates 
from.  
 It is therefore this essential and fundamental “circumstance” that philosophy 
should deal with in regard to “time”. Its interest should not be to try to draw up some 
“general”, “common”, or “primordial”, yet by now completely lost concept of “time”. 
Instead, we should realize: the interwoven questions and questionings of the What?, the 
When?, and the What is time? deriving from it – if we understand them – show and 
reveal exactly that the What?-ness of Time is completely inseparable from the What?-
ness of When?! That is: from the question of When? and its (particular, so categorial) 
question-nature! 
 That is to say, the horizons of the existence of time and the time of existence are 
essentially and factually inseparable from the question and questioning. And also from 
the questioner! Who therefore is not only “conscious” of time and who does not merely 
have an (inner) “time consciousness”, but who – precisely because of this – is temporal 
or time-related! Because he is finite as a dying mortal.  
 Now, in order not to think of the future and thus time itself in terms of death, or 
as attached, connected to death, it is not enough to take a different, seemingly more 
cheerful standpoint or to “vote”! Instead, we should chase death out of our lives, our 
existence… 
 Naturally, the understanding and interpretation of that constant urge of us 
people to find or lend some kind of “meaning” – and especially “positive” meaning! – to 
death is also connected to this…1 
 But what could this endeavour mean once acknowledged that there is not, there 
cannot be any kind of “meaning” without death?! Since without it there could not be 
any meaningful – even categorial – fundamental question or basis for question.  
 Therefore “to give meaning to death” can actually and primarily only mean 
precisely the understanding and acceptance of this issue! Namely, the understanding and 
acceptance of the fact that in its basic – equally ontological and existential-historical – 
way death is the root and source of every kind of – essentially ontologically burdened – 
meaning.2  
 On this account then we do not simply “lend-give-attribute” “this” meaning to 
death “from the outside”, but we may primarily “only” understand death as – at least one 
of – the original, ultimate, metaphysical, fact-like sources that approach our being and 
pertain to it, and as an ontological constitution and horizon of meanings.3 
 A source, constitution and horizon, which is – ontologically too! – fact and 
metaphysics at the same time.4 To the facticity of which its metaphysical nature pertains 
in a constitutive and inseparable way. And the other way round: to the metaphysics of 
which its fact-nature also pertains in a constitutive and inseparable way! 
 So it may be repeated now in a more substantial way: in order not to think of the 
future and thus time itself in terms of death, or as attached, connected to death, it is not 
enough to take a different, seemingly more cheerful or pleasant standpoint or to “vote”! 
Instead, we should chase death out of our lives, our existence! Until then, however, 
                                                 
1
 See Armin Nassehi and Georg Weber, Tod, Modernität und Gesellschaft – Entwurf einer 
Theorie der Todesverdrängung (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1989), 483. 
2
 Which does not mean of course that “all” the human meanings of death are exhausted “in this”. 
For more on this, see the Excursus entitled A halál hermeneutikája (The hermeneutics of death) 
in the article A meghalásról (On dying) from my volume Halandóan lakozik szabadságában az 
ember...  
3
 This is in fact a fundamental ontological-existential statement, which has nothing to do with the 
endeavour to “domesticate” death or make it “friendlier”, or directly attempt at the quite fantastic 
banishment of mortal fear. On the contrary! It rather surfaces the emptiness and unsustainability 
of the prevailing opinion that, in order to render meaning to death, there is need of the 
“surpassing” – or rather: denial – of its “reality”. So that death’s “indefinite” nature, which 
“overshadows” the future and makes it “uncertain”, can be emphasized. In connection to these 
latter references – or as such an endeavour – see also Nassehi and Weber, Tod, Modernität und 
Gesellschaft, 432. 
4
 See also the article entitled A meghalásról in the volume Halandóan lakozik szabadságában az 
ember..., 7–109. 
death factually – that is, in its essential metaphysical fact-nature as the foundation of 
historicity – “stands” there in the all-time historical “time”, or rather the all-time 
“future” of the all-time people. Primordially, holding, and being held.  
 However, these days the future is becoming more and more “shocking”. 
Because it somehow always arrives too soon, and therefore two early. So the future 
today – purportedly – is not what it used to be… One cannot be prepared for it, nor 
escape it by other appearances, at least apparently. These days, the future, day after day, 
unavoidably and “sensibly” sets in. It surprises us continuously, day by day, and thus 
also “shocks” us.  
 Nonetheless, this surprise is in fact nothing surprising. The future has always 
been a surprise, or surprising. Because what surprises and has always surprised us in the 
future is not what “concretely” happens to us or falls onto us, or even threatens us as 
future. But much rather that from what the future as future actually or directly “comes”. 
Namely: ultimately precisely death. What we keep escaping from, albeit in advance.  
 These days we increasingly escape from death forward – let’s say, to 
“development”, “innovation”, or mere change, etc. Therefore the future comes sooner 
today. And we die “later” than before. This way the future does not simply come faster, 
but also more densely, and in a continuous or what is more, even permanent way. So its 
present surprise is indeed directly “stressing”. 
 Time “accelerates” – is accelerated – indeed these days. But the acceleration of 
time as a “self-affection” of temporality is essentially only rooted in the existential-
historical modification of the direction of escape. It is forward that we escape from the 
future nowadays. It is forward that we escape therefore from where the When? and with 
it, time itself – originates or issues.  
 This is why the time speeded up in escaping forward seems also continuously 
“new”. Neue Zeit, Temps Nouveaux, New Age, Új idők: New Era! Only because the 
escape – the ancient escape from death, from ourselves, from existence – took indeed a 
new direction. Naturally, the escape itself is also founded upon advancement, self-
anticipation, and thus temporality… that is, directly on the future. So that the escaper’s 
“fate” has also been long decided.  
 The direction of escape stretches towards the end of the in-finite, the endless 
time. Which – only apparently, but still – suspends the When? or renders it meaningless. 
For does the Whenς matter anything in the endless time, in “eternal” time, in the time of 
“eternity”ς In the time when the Whenς and the Never are all the same… Always, 
“constantly”, and all the time. There is, there can be No… Whenς in it! It is 
incomprehensible therefore, why would there be any kind of “meaning” in it at allς 
Beyond the fact, of course, that it still offers a direction, or “supplies” a direction-like 
pretext for escaping.  
 This “supply”, however, is in fact mostly only instrument and technology. But it 
is by far not a meaning to be understood. For this meaning cannot simply be supplied 
and served, and then, again, “simply” put into practice. The meaning can only be asked, 
and the meaning to be understood cannot possibly derive from any other place than 
questioning. Never and in no time.  
 So the endless time can only find its own meaning in the question which alone 
may understand that by the When? it questions the end and from this end questions the 
being in connection to which this end and our relation to it should or must always be 
questionable.  
 Actually, time begins – arises! – in fact from its end, that is, from the future… 
And the actual, accepted and thus defined time must therefore only begin – arise! – from 
here as well. 
 Therefore time itself begins, arises in the “time” which counts indeed with the 
interchanging movement of various movements, when – as a completely new 
dimension of being and utterly undatably – the When? is first outlined. And from this 
point on it must be asked and validated – even in a dated way – in all directions.  
 By this however the When? – and with it, time too – stands or situates itself into 
the airy and held freedom of an opening-arising questioning pertaining  and connected to 
being, that is, in fact into the freedom constituted by the questioning itself, into the 
factual questioning of freedom! “Into” the freedom, that is, which is itself – 
ontologically and historically-existentially – question, and has the structure of a 
question.1 Since it is mortal! 
 As such, naturally freedom is also: holding and held. Therefore the opening-up, 
arising, datable-historical questioning of the truth may also take its place as a question 
in it. Which will surely re-question the truth of the When? and the all-time historical 
truth connected to the Whenς as well… 
 And of course it will re-question the finite, actual, living, creating, grave, 
dangerous and failing – the deadly, questionable, question-inducing, questioning – 
freedom also. As a possibility and as a chance! 
 Together with the When? and the new dimension of being coming into being in 
the When? – just as being itself – time also arrives at meaning, or more precisely 
meaning-question. By this however – so to say – it exactly becomes primordial.  
 Because with the coming into being of the Dasein, for a while, time is being 
born again – and also being born anew – in questioning – primarily in the When? of 
course, in a new dimension of being. At the time when “time becomes temporal”. 2 That 
is, in the most possibly complex and serious meaning – in the questionableness of 
meaning itself – it becomes finite.3 Therefore: such a thing may even become actual. 
(With the specification that the adjectives “actual”, “authentic”, etc. are not “ideal” and 
“metaphysical” notions in the traditional sense – that is, valid once and for all – but 
hermeneutical-historical ones, which primarily focus not so much on “states” but 
possibilities. So the non-actuality of the Dasein does not mean any kind of “diminished” 
being or a “lower” degree of being.)4 
 However, time can always become actual starting from itself, but never only 
from itself, and even less simply “by itself”. Because time, the Past, the Present, and the 
Future do not only go towards us, but also onto us. And pertain to us of course.  
 Because the “meaning” does not go beyond things and issues by simply 
“cutting through” or “crossing” them, but by turning back to them. And to ourselves, of 
course. And by this, to existence as well. 
                                                 
1
 For more details on this, see the article Hagyomány és a szabadság kérdezése – Heidegger és 
Gadamer in the volume Kérdő jelezés…. 
2
 See: Jan Patočka, “Az idő, az örökkévalóság és az időbeliség Mácha műveiben” (Time, eternity, 
and temporality in Mácha’s works), in Jan Patočka, Mi a cseh? – esszék és tanulmányok (What is 
the Czech? – Essays and studies) (Pozsony (Bratislava): Kalligram, 1996), 122. 
3
 No kind of merely “physical” or “natural scientific” time can ever be “actual” – and nor can it 
be “non-actual”. Maybe only “precise” or “more precise”… 
4
 See, Heidegger Being and time, 43. 
 It is only this kind of turning back that will go then “beyond” and “above” to a 
meaning always possible and made again possible. And this – by another name – is 
nothing else again than history.1  
 So, it is in this thematically and applied philosophically undertaken and surfaced 
mutual reference that the existentially questionable and of course existential-historical 
issues of the future, death, freedom,2 and the truth prove indeed to pertain to, and 
involve, each other. Because we do not only “possess the consciousness” of time, but we 
are in fact its consciousness… 
 However, we are not only the “consciousness” of time, but also – to a much 
greater degree, and more primordially: its being. Which is constituted and exists in the 
questioning – that is, in the When? – and the permanently historically articulated 
horizon of this question, and the also permanent categorial “universality” of this 
horizon, as well as in the existentially articulated factuality of the historical conducting 
of the questioning of the When?. Thus, it is as a question of meaning and therefore 
possibly as a meaning.   
 The essence of this is exactly the future. Primarily that from where and because 
of what the future… comes! And because of what the Future itself is not a mere 
possibility, but directly a “task”.3 Essentially – and not only seen from its concrete 
outlines – this possibility and this task pertaining to us and involving us is the possibility 
and task of becoming a mortal.  
                                                 
1
 The temporality of “meaning” – referring to the fact whether something has any meaning at all, 
or how this meaning is articulated and outlined, and not to the fact that whatever “time” or 
“temporality” gets suddenly or continuously “connected” to some kind of self-standing 
“meaning” – always has something to do primarily with the future. No matter what kind of 
meaning originates or derives from tradition, however, it gains its pregnancy with a view to the 
horizon- and world-like, co-temporalizing meaningfulness of the interpretation, that is, its 
possible projectability to the future. This is the hermeneutical meaning of “application”. Since the 
application always connected to interpretation is never some kind of putting into practice, but 
something which happens with the interpreter in the course of, or starting from, interpretation. In 
other words: a self-changing experience. Gadamer in the Truth and Method – not accidentally 
connecting to Heidegger – speaks very clearly about how the misunderstanding around 
Heidegger’s ontological explanation of the horizon of time takes revenge. Instead of keeping the 
methodological meaning of the existential analytics of the Dasein, they treated the existential 
historical temporality of the Dasein determined by care, by the running-forth to death, that is, by 
radical finiteness as if it were only one of the possible interpretations of existence, and forgot that 
it was in fact the mode of being of understanding itself. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and 
Method (New York: The Seabury Press, 1975), 110–118. Therefore the loss of meaning is always 
coupled with the loss of future, and the loss of future is always coupled with the loss of meaning. 
And together with this, or rather precisely because of this, there are always possibilities of 
existence being lost. It is not accidental that neurologists, psychiatrists, or psychologists equally 
found out that the brain injuries which lead to a “short-sidedness about the future” had to do in 
fact with the meanings which are indispensable in any situation of decision making. And which, 
thus, always “brings into play” the future exactly, including the so-called “adaptive future” as 
well. See also Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error – Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain, 
(New York: Penguin, 2005), 243–264. 
2
 “Although the decision of freedom, the acceptance of the mission, and the taking into account 
of the possibilities essentially lead to different dimensions of time, they are still inseparable from 
each other.” See Patočka, Mi a cseh?, 117. 
3
 It is not by chance that Kant connects not only the morals, but also freedom to duty.  
 This possibility and possible approach, consciousness, and task – for us people – 
is actually only opened up and exhibited by philosophy alone. Not by science, which at 
most can only determine finiteness and push the actual limits to the edge; not by 
technology, which fills these up and prolongs them; not by politics, which only settles or 
only “uses” the limits; not by art, which opens and places constantly tuned and re-tuned 
worlds before the possible completeness of the truth…; and not by religion, which 
mostly only consoles because of it… 
 Only and exclusively philosophy, which meanwhile also reveals and displays 
that: to “become a mortal” is not confined to, nor restricted to a merely “thematic” 
consciousness – albeit important in itself – of death and the events of dying, but it 
touches, embraces, and, of course – being held by it – also holds the man’s entire 
existence and its entire “responsibility” as a real meaning. That from where the future is 
coming! 
 Now the – seemingly meaningful – question could be asked whether it is “all the 
same” if the man considers or thinks himself mortal or – even if “only in soul”, but – 
immortal? Especially if this latter possibility may seem for some reason more pleasant 
and attractive to him?! 
 In spite of this – at least for the sake of the seriousness and persistence of 
thinking – this question still needs to be reformulated. It should rather be asked as 
follows: Could there be any connection between the way the historical man has treated 
and treats the other living creatures (plants and animals); the way the historical man has 
treated and treats the Earth, its possibilities and resources; the way the historical man has 
treated and treats himself and the others – for example, but not exclusively, in the 
terrorism of these days – well, could there be any connection between this behaviour 
and the circumstance that all this while the man has considered and considers, has 
believed and believes himself immortal?  
 For what else could this possibly be than the gradual exhaustion and liquidation 
of the foundation, the sources, the ground of his own life and the continuous restriction, 
in these respects, of his future existential possibilities? Something which is not very 
reasonable and advisable to do for finite mortal beings, subject to (life) circumstances… 
However, for an “immortal” these are of course indifferent concerns… so all similar 
things are in fact completely irrelevant for him, even if unreasonably or unadmittedly. 
 Yet, this is surely the place of origin of the famous, original, and never 
surpassed or given up contemptus mundi, the contempt of the world, or rather the hatred 
of the “world”. This is again something that only the immortals could permit for 
themselves “regardless of the consequences”.  
 Furthermore, we may not seriously think that we could so easily disregard the 
question of the “truth”. Namely the fact to what extent such an idea might prove to be 
true? With the completion that this truth is not only connected to the (otherwise 
metaphysical) facticity of death and dying, but also with everything else that makes up 
human existence and its historical possibilities! Therefore the mortality of the man is not 
only “proved” by the factuality of each of our deaths, but rather by each or all of the 
man’s modes of being! 
 Namely, the fact alone that wherever there is man, there are also settlements, 
buildings, institutions, many-sided communication networks and relations, particular 
human endeavours (cognition, science, art, technology, murderous wars, and comforting 
religions flourishing nearby, etc.) betrays and proves or stands as evidence for the 
mortality of man. Such a thing can only be meaningful and have some weight for the 
existence of a mortally finite – that is, Dasein-like – being. A truly mortal being – even 
if only in his soul or any other respect of his existence, etc. – would not be forced to 
continuously undertake the efforts of knowledge, creation, or perfection.1  
 As we have seen, the question and questionableness of mortality is in fact about 
the truth of man and being! And we humans – let me repeat it – can thematize it for 
ourselves only and exclusively by philosophy in an authentic way that corresponds to 
the force and weight of the unavoidable and trying historical – that is, one that 
articulates history itself – re-emergence of this issue.2 By philosophy, as we have 
already pointed out, which meanwhile also reveals and displays that: to “become a 
mortal” is not confined to, nor restricted to a merely “thematic” consciousness – albeit 
important in itself – of death and the events of dying, but it touches, embraces, and, of 
course also holds the man’s – and being’s – entire existence and its entire 
“responsibility” as a real meaning – and thus as a response, as well.  
That from where the future is coming! It is only and exclusively here therefore 
that the basically new “God” may – although “incidentally” – come from, of whom 
alone Heidegger for instance expected redemption once. And for the advent of whom 
philosophy – or more precisely essential thinking – can only signal us to prepare 
ourselves. 3 
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 One of the most problematic parts of Kant’s moral- and religious philosophy is exactly the fact 
that he connects the doctrine of the “immortality of the soul” to these, because of the reason – 
among others – that such a thing would ensure the soul’s infinite self-perfecting. However, it is in 
fact completely incomprehensible how a truly immortal soul would perfect itself eternally in 
infinity? In its immortality it could just as well abject itself infinitely and remain untouched… or 
it could also wander undisturbed back and forth between perfection and abjection. But if the soul 
perfects itself in immortality (too) because, say, this inclination is somehow rooted in it, than 
there is no need of its, as it were, highly problematic “immortality” to ensure its perfection. 
2
 Nobody saw more clearly this force and weight of death and mortality which grounds and 
articulates history and historicity than two seemingly very distant thinkers: Thomas Hobbes and 
Martin Heidegger. Hobbes treats self-preservation and mortal fear closely linked to it as the 
fundamental law of human society, history, and the world. It is of course this latter, namely 
mortal fear, which urges people – the mortals forced to self-preservation – to make contracts and 
create states, laws, and rights, obey them, and have them obeyed. These can also ensure their 
self-preservation. At any rate, it is undoubtedly death and the fear of death that grounds, 
articulates, and operates human history in its most essential and characteristic dynamic and 
structural respects (state, right, morality, etc). (See Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan 
http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/hobbes/leviathan-.html, downloaded Febr. 27, 2010). 
On the other hand, Martin Heidegger towards the end of the analyses in the Being and Time 
makes it explicitly clear that the actual being related to death, that is, the finiteness of temporality 
is the concealed basis of the historicity of the Dasein. (See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 
449.) This issue is treated in most details in the first chapter of my volume KÉRDÉS-PONTOK a 
történelemhez, a halálhoz..., which on this account bears the title Halál és történelem – 
Prolegoména egy „történelemfilozófiai” illetve történelemontológiai lehetőséghez (Death and 
history – Prolegomena for the possibility of a “philosophy of history” or ontology of history), in 
Ibid., 7–109. 
3
 For more details on this, see the article “Hagyomány és a szabadság kérdezése – Gadamer és 
Heidegger” in the volume Kérdő jelezés…, with special emphasis on the Excursus entitled “A 
filozófia és a ‘hatás’, avagy az önveszélyességről a filozófiában” (Philosophy and the “effect”, or 
on self-dangerousness in philosophy), 195–205. 
 For the same reason again, this God may probably only be the God of the 
existential truth of becoming a mortal… Not “simply” “another one”, but much rather a 
radically new Divinity, essentially differing from and – what’s more! – contrasting all 
previous Gods. A God that man can face in the questioning and questionable fear and 
love-adoration of existential truth and the truth of his existence, and not in his yearning 
for the convictional defencelessness of the professed promises of consolation.  
 Instead, the God of becoming mortal can only be such that already knows about 
himself that he can only live mightily as long as the faith in him and those who believe 
in him are alive! And who, by this, somehow also becomes capable of dying. In the 
absence of this, with the death of the faith in him and of those who believe in him he 
would not die, but simply die away or become extinct.  
 However, all previous Deities were only Gods of the punishing-promising-
comforting – in Tolstoy’s words – “lies” of “immortality”, of “deathlessness”. Actually, 
they all were the Gods of the incapability of human dying, or more precisely of (the 
man’s) actual and present becoming mortal. What is more, at least according to 
Nietzsche, they have long been exhausted, and they have died themselves long ago. The 
smell of their putrefaction however (because, as Nietzsche says again: „Do we not hear 
the noise of the grave-diggers who are burying God? Do we not smell the divine 
putrefaction? – for even Gods putrefy!”1) keeps distancing, and holds at a distance the 
very incidental, yet too late arrivals of an also very incidental new God… 
 Therefore the possibility of a human existence, of a man who not only dies but 
is already indeed mortal should be more seriously considered.  
 Despite the fact that – at least apparently – such a human existence could 
somehow only be a “hopeless” existence. Probably only “apparently”, because during all 
this while the following question has never emerged: does “hope” itself – insofar as it 
does not mean some witless, sensible, yet essentially turning-away kind of staring at 
the “evidences”, nor some etiquette-forced, smiling-optimistic approach to the course of 
things – not derive from death, from human mortality in a deep and as yet unthought of, 
yet very determined way and meaning? Moreover, is it not precisely death that hope 
gains its actual meaning, and dynamic, mobilizing weight from? Just like, as we have 
seen, meanings themselves. And just like man’s – the hopeful being’s! – ontological 
“identity” or selfness…  
 So in order to understand hope, “first” – and also “meanwhile” – we must 
understand death. Because if there was no death, no mortal, and no dying – and thus no 
human life with real weight, then there “would be” no hope either. It is not accidental at 
all, what’s more, it is characteristic and very telling about hope itself too, that the 
ultimate of hopes is exactly the hope of immortality, that is, deathlessness. Something 
which, were it fulfilled, would not only render superfluous, but outright meaningless not 
only the hope invested into it, but all hope in general… 
 Well of course, hope is projected into the future. Mostly and primarily as an 
expectance-like waiting, which, in a way, mostly expects things to be “positively” 
solved. Therefore the man does not usually “hope” for natural catastrophes or failures… 
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 See Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science (125),  
http://nietzsche.holtof.com/Nietzsche_the_gay_science/the_gay_science.htm. Downloaded Febr. 
27, 2010. 
On the contrary, hope is always penetrated by desire. We hope that the “possibility” – or 
rather eventuality – that will indeed happen will be something that we desire.1 
 So, again: the possibility of human existence, of the man who not only dies, but 
is indeed a mortal would still need a more fundamental consideration. It may well 
happen that this would truly belong to a “more glorious story than any other previous 
stories”. “Is not the magnitude of this deed too great for usς Shall we not ourselves have 
to become Gods, merely to seem worthy of it? There never was a greater event – and on 
account of it, all who are born after us belong to a higher history than any history 
hitherto!”2 
 To a story in which it is permanently questionable and again permanently 
questioned, always, radically – that is, penetrating to the very roots – and anew, whether 
we understand, or better understand time? Do we understand, do we understand better 
and more seriously its pertinence and belonging to us, and the questionableness and 
explicit question-nature of this pertinence and belonging? 
 And together with this, do we also understand indeed that the true “problems” 
are not created primarily from the insufficiencies, unclearness, and obscurities deriving 
from the lack of “information” and “data”, but precisely by “certainties”. Namely, that 
all such fundamental and categorial certainties sooner or later prove to actually, 
originally, and precisely be: questions! Which must always be asked over and over 
again. 
 However, this may also reveal that, while being asked, these questions deriving 
precisely from certainties lead the all-time questioner to things which in one direction 
must be called (that is: we must call it) death, while in the other direction must be called 
freedom and history! In other words, it leads to things that are themselves cooriginary 
questions. And they are questionable in a way which has common origins deriving from 
each other and also sending to each other. And which thus – within us and by us – ask 
and search for the all-time truth of both themselves and the questioner. In the explicit – 
human – happening of history! 
 
Translated by Emese G. Czintos 
                                                 
1
 This is not the place to confront this with Ernst Bloch’s philosophy based on the principles of 
hope and utopia. However, it must be said that the philosophy-of-historical rethinking of the 
utopias rooted in hope as a principle basically surfaces that the actual “necessity” of hope is not 
what is hoped for, but “hope” indeed. So that there is, there might be hope at all. By which then 
the unhopeful can just as well be easily hoped for. This would of course make hope 
unconditioned, or rather it would push aside any of its conditions… It is not sure however that 
such a thing should indeed be “hoped” for. 
2
 See Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 125. 
